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Abstract. Future communication networks such as 5G are expected to
support end-to-end delivery of services for several vertical markets with
diverging requirements. Network slicing is a key construct that is used
to provide end to end logical virtual networks running on a common
virtualised infrastructure, which are mutually isolated. Having different
network slices operating over the same 5G infrastructure creates several
challenges in security and trust. This paper addresses the fundamental
issue of trust of a network slice. It presents a trust model and property-
based trust attestation mechanisms which can be used to evaluate the
trust of the virtual network functions that compose the network slice.
The proposed model helps to determine the trust of the virtual net-
work functions as well as the properties that should be satisfied by the
virtual platforms (both at boot and run time) on which these network
functions are deployed for them to be trusted. We present a logic-based
language that defines simple rules for the specification of properties and
the conditions under which these properties are evaluated to be sat-
isfied for trusted virtualised platforms. The proposed trust model and
mechanisms enable the service providers to determine the trustworthi-
ness of the network services as well as the users to develop trustworthy
applications. We have developed a trust management architecture and
mechanisms that enable the service providers to determine the trustwor-
thiness of the network slices providing the network services. We have
implemented a prototype of the trust management architecture using
Open Source MANO Platform and presented the performance results.
The results show that our trust mechanisms cause only a slight delay in
the performance of the deployment of network slices establishing end to
end services over virtualised infrastructures. We have also discussed how
the proposed architecture can be used to detect and mitigate the impact
of malicious virtual network functions in a dynamic manner.
Keywords: Network Function Virtualisation Trust, Network Slice Trust, Trust
Management, Property-based Attestation.
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1 Introduction
Future communication networks such as 5G are expected to support end-to-end
delivery of services for several vertical markets with diverging requirements. 5G
networks will provide virtually ubiquitous, ultra-high bandwidth and low latency
connectivity not only to individual users but also to connected objects. Unlike
the previous network architectures, 5G architectures are programmable to ac-
commodate user requests at run-time, allowing network and providers to derive
much benefit through high network throughput and performance [18].
Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network Function Virtualisation (NFV)
are the two key technologies that fuel the development of 5G architecture [1].
SDN enables programming and control of virtualized network resources, whereas
NFV allows network functions to be virtualized and run over commodity hard-
ware, enabling flexible resource allocation and sharing. The combination of SDN
and NFV helps to make 5G an elastic, resource agnostic, service-oriented net-
work. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has developed
a 5G network architecture standard known as open source Management and Or-
chestration (MANO) [7]. It introduces a key concept called network slicing to cre-
ate end to end logical virtual networks running over a common virtualised infras-
tructure, which are mutually isolated. The SDN and NFV technologies provide
the programmability and flexibility to create these network slices, enabling ser-
vice providers and end users (customers) to request, deploy and provision end-to-
end network services on-demand without concerning about the underlying hard-
ware. However having different network slices operating over the same 5G net-
work infrastructure creates several challenges in security [14], [23], [3], [4], [9], [8].
Trust is a fundamental challenge in the design and deployment of network slices,
as they can belong to different users and service providers, and can be imple-
mented over different infrastructures provided by different operators, providing
services to applications in different business sectors [9], [8]. A key design issue is
whether a particular platform in the infrastructure (e.g. a virtual machine) is in
a state that it is expected to be, that is, a trusted state before the deployment of
virtual network functions. Moreover, as networks and virtual machine platforms
such as hypervisors are susceptible to be a range of security attacks, these in-
frastructure components can become untrusted during the course of operation,
impacting the network services that are being run on them. Furthermore, a net-
work slice may use some virtual network functions developed by third parties,
which can be malicious or can get infected during run time. Therefore the abil-
ity to reason about trust of network slices is critical, both from the user and
provider perspectives, when it comes to reasoning about trust of 5G networks
and the provisioning of secure network services. Hence the focus of this paper
is to develop techniques for reasoning about trust properties of network slices
which form the basis of provision of secure end to end services over 5G networks.
We develop a trust model and the trust properties that need to be satisfied by
the various components in the infrastructure in the creation to deployment of
trusted network slices leading to establishment of 5G network services. Our trust
model specifies trust relations between the different 5G components and actors in
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terms of property based attestation properties of virtualised platforms providing
the network services. We introduce a logic based language to capture the trust
requirements and specify the trust relations and properties in the 5G network
infrastructure. Then we develop a trust management architecture to evaluate the
trust of the virtual network functions being deployed in virtual machines and
determine the trustworthiness of network slices providing end to end services in
5G networks.
The significance of this work is that the proposed trust model and architecture
can be used to enhance the quality of decisions made by the services in the 5G
architecture, including security services such as access control and attack detec-
tion decisions. This in turn can lay the foundations of a trust enhanced security
architecture for 5G network services.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we begin with a brief de-
scription of the architecture of the 5G virtualised network infrastructure. This
will help to identify explicitly the basic trust issues that can arise in such an
environment. Section 3 specifies the trust model and the trust properties that
need to be satisfied by the various components in the architecture that are in-
volved in the creation and deployment of network slices. We also introduce a
logic based policy language that is used to specify the trust properties and the
trust derivation process to evaluate the trust of a network slice using the trust
model. Section 4 describes our prototype implementation of the trust model and
instantiation of trusted network slices using the Open Source MANO platform
for 5G networks. In Section 5, we present an analysis of trust properties of our
prototype as well as an analysis of network performance and their results. In
Section 6, we compare our trust model and architecture with previous relevant
related works. Finally, Section 7 summarises our conclusions and outlines some
future work.
2 Architecture Overview and Network Slice Deployment
In this section, we briefly outline the key components of the 5G network archi-
tecture that is directly relevant to the trusted network slice discussions in this
paper. The purpose of this architectural description is that it will enable us to
extract the trust requirements and assumptions needed for the design of the
trust model and mechanisms in the next section.
Architecture Overview
In this network architecture [19], software-based virtual network functions (VNFs)
are instantiated across a diverse range of virtual machines (VMs), connected and
chained together in a certain way to achieve the desired network services. This
architecture is mainly composed of three main functional blocks: network func-
tion virtualisation infrastructure (NFVI), VNFs, and NFV Management and
Orchestration (NFV MANO), as illustrated in Fig. 2. Associated with these
blocks are their respective management authorities, namely Virtualized Infras-
tructure Manager (VIM), VNF Manager (VNFM) and NFV Orchestration Man-
ager (NFVO-M).
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Consider a simplified view of such an architecture. The VNFs are implemented as
software instances running on infrastructure resources, which include hardware,
storage capacity, networking resources and physical assets for radio access. These
VNFs are managed by a VNFM. The virtual and physical resources on which
these VNFs run are managed by the VIM in the domain. NFVO-M manages
both resource and service orchestration. The resource orchestration involves the
coordination of resources under different VIMs, whereas service orchestration
involves the creation and coordination of end-to-end services with VNFs under
different VNFMs.
Network Slice Deployment
The virtualised network functions and the associated authorities enable the 5G
infrastructure to support network slicing. A network slice comprises a collection
of VNFs to form the network services that are delivered to the users (or ten-
ants). Each tenant can have several network slices under its management and
a network slice can be used by several tenants in a multi-tenant environment.
Network slicing enables concurrent logical networks providing various network
services and functionalities to different tenants. For instance, an emergency net-
work slice that allows immediate and on-demand services for patients, a highly
secure communication slice for confidential video and audio communications for
defense users, and a low-bandwidth network slice for IoT devices used by IoT
users and applications.
The creation and deployment of network slices use their associated resource and
infrastructure attributes; NFVO-M maintains a repository of these network slices
with their related attributes. The VNFs in a network slice are deployed in virtual
machines (VMs) running over infrastructure provided by the cloud or network
provider. VNFM deploys the VNFs on VMs that are suitable, depending on VMs’
attributes. The VM resources are managed by the VIM through SDN controller.
The SDN controller works in conjunction with the VIM in the creation and
establishment of both physical and virtual network communications. Finally,
the users are assigned to these created and deployed network slices providing
them with the requested network services.
2.1 Problem Motivation and Trust Requirements
Network service providers or users (tenants) request the creation and deployment
of network slices. As outlined above, authorities take the necessary steps to
create, deploy and provision the network slices to the requester. The requester
uses the network services provided by the network slices for their information
transfers and their applications. This raises the fundamental issue of trust in
the provision of network services. That is, the trustworthiness of the network
slices and the trustworthiness of the deployment of virtual network functions
(VNFs) in the network slices on virtual and physical platforms (VMs) in the
infrastructure providing these services. From the tenant or user perspective,
how to trust the network slice and the VNFs, NFV infrastructure (NFVI) and
their providers? From the point of view of VNF manager, how to trust the
platform where VNFs are being deployed and executed? For the infrastructure
provider VIM (and SDN Controller), how to trust the VNFs that are being
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deployed on their resources? There can be a number of security threats on these
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Fig. 1: A Network Slice Scenario
different infrastructure components such as VNFs, the VMs, the hypervisor on
which these VMs run as well as the networks. Furthermore, there can be several
parties providing the VNFs and the VMs in the network and cloud infrastructure.
Compromise of VMs by an attacker in turn affects the virtual network functions
being executed in these VMs. For instance, a logic-bomb integrated into a VM
can remain undetected during VNF deployment until activated by a trigger,
making the network slice malicious. This will impact the trust of the service
provider or the tenant using the services provided by the network slice.
Fig 1 shows a scenario in which a malicious virtual machine-VM06 has been
used to create a VNF3. The VM has been tampered during the build process
and injected with a logic-bomb. The VNF3 serves as a fast software switch and
deployed by the NS400 network slice, which provides a high bandwidth network
to users A and B, and the Telco provider X. VNF3 passes all the security checks
as the malware code is not active initially. Once deployed the malware in VNF3
only becomes active after it receives a trigger from a specific IP address. Then the
software switch starts to perform various malicious activities, making the whole
network slice untrustworthy. However, the users A and B, and the Telco provider
X are unaware of the malicious behaviour of the network slice. This example
illustrates the need for mechanisms that can help the user of the network slice
to determine the trustworthiness of a network slice at any time (both at boot
time as well as at run time).
More specifically, the architecture should provide mechanisms that can determine
the trust of the various infrastructure components that are used in the creation of
the network slice as well as in its deployment on virtual and physical resources in
the network infrastructure. That is, in order to reason about the trustworthiness
of a network slice, the architecture should provide the following mechanisms:
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(a) Mechanisms to determine the trust of a VNF at the time of formation of a
network slice, (b) Mechanisms to determine the trust of a VM at the time of
deployment of VNF on the VM, and (c) Mechanisms to determine the trust of
a physical platform before the deployment of the VM on the platform.
3 Trust Model
In this section, we propose a trust model, which defines the trust properties that
need to be satisfied by the the various components such as VNFs,and VMs that
are involved in the creation and deployment of network slices. This will then
lead to the formulation of the trust of a network slice. The trust management
architecture, corresponding to the trust model providing mechanisms identified
above (a) to (c), is described in Section 4.
Our trust model is based on both binary attestation and property based attes-
tation. In attestation, the basic idea is that an entity is trusted if it behaves
as expected for a specific purpose [15]. Trust is evaluated by measuring the
state (and behaviour) of an entity at a given point in time, and then comparing
the measured state with the (reference) expected state. If the measured state
matches with the expected state, then the entity is trusted.
In our case, a network slice consists of a set of VNFs that provide the network
services of that slice. So a network slice is trusted at a given time if all the VNFs
of the slice are trusted at that time. A VNF is trusted if the state of the VNF
at that time matches with the reference state of that VNF. As each VNF is a
software component, the state of a VNF can be defined in terms of its hashed
digest. So by comparing the hashed digest of a VNF (at a given time) with the
reference (expected) hashed digest of that VNF provided by the manufacturer,
the trust of a VNF can be determined. Hence we can determine the trust of the
network slice composed of a set of VNFs, using such hash based binary attesta-
tion.
The algorithms required for this attestation include an algorithm to calculate
the hashed digest of a VNF and an algorithm to compare this measured value
with the reference value. Such matching condition is defined in terms of trust
constraints that should be satisfied by a VNF before it is included in the com-
position of a network slice. Furthermore, these hash values need to be signed
by appropriate trusted authorities for them to be trusted (e.g. a Certification
Authority). We will consider the trusted authorities in Section 4 on the trust
management architecture.
However binary hash measurements of a VNF is mainly a representation of the
VNF’s implementation rather than about its behavioural properties, which are
often more important when evaluating trust. Unlike hash measurements which
change whenever a VNF is updated, its properties may not. As properties do
not reveal the implementation details of the VNF, they can provide a higher
level of privacy. Furthermore, properties can be more meaningful and easier to
understand. Hence our model uses property based attestation to reason about
the properties satisfied by VNFs and VMs at a given state.
In our model, the properties are represented at different levels of granularity.
Some properties represent implementation constraints that are enforced on the
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VNFs such as ”absence of buffer overflow”. Some others are generic such as a
”VNF does not have any third-party software component running within it”. In
general, our approach is to specify properties as constraints or rules in a pol-
icy that need to be satisfied by an entity for it to be trusted. For example, a
VNF satisfies the mandatory access control property by enforcing the Bell-La
Padula security rules [2]. Or a VNF satisfies the confidentiality property with
its output data encrypted using AES algorithm. As in the case of binary hash
attestation, we require trusted authorities in property based attestation who can
vouch for the properties possessed by an entity. In general, there can be multiple
such authorities vouching for different properties. For the specifications of trust
properties, we have developed a policy language introduced in the next section
(Section 4).
3.1 High Level Trust Model Description
We give a brief overview of the trust model at a high level, outlining the pre-
liminaries and basic sets and predicates to that formulate properties associated
with components (such as VNFs and VMs) as well as the composition of these
components in the form of a network slice. We also outline the trust derivation
algorithm to evaluate the trust of the network slice. We have introduced con-
structs of a simple Logic based language for Property Attestation based Trust
(LOPAT) to specify the properties in our trust model. Though these constructs
have been in terms of network slices and software components (VNFs), they are
equally applicable to systems and hardware components as well as platforms
such as hypervisors and virtual machines as the components running on their
top.
Definition 1. Network Slice - A network slice is a collection of all components
(e.g. VNFs) within it.
Definition 2. Component - Each VNF component inside a Network Slice is
termed a component. Each component can perform one or more network func-
tions, either individually or when combined with one or more components in the
network slice.
Note such a definition also applies to a hardware component in the system model.
Definition 3. Composition - The term composition refers to the act of inter-
connecting two or more components in a network slice in a certain fashion to
provide a specific network service.
In general, the process of composition is an iterative one until the entire network
slice is built. It is easier to verify individual components’ properties (which are
smaller in size) rather than attempting to verify one large monolithic system.
Furthermore, the composition process may not preserve the properties of the
individual constituent components. This is not a trivial task.
Definition 4. Property - A property is defined as any attribute, characteristic
or behaviour associated with a component or a network slice.
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Definition 5. Target: A target is a subject (e.g. user) or an object to which a
property of a component or a network slice is bound.
For example, let us consider an authentication service where all users are au-
thenticated using passwords and all login attempts are recorded. Here, the au-
thentication component supports the identity verification property of all users
(targets). Additionally, the authentication component securely logs (property)
all login outcomes (target). Here, we can see that a property of a component is
more meaningful when it is bound to a specific target.
The basic preliminaries in our model are as follows:
1. Constant Symbols: Every member of NS ∪ C ∪ P ∪ T ∪ R ∪ A ∪ PER ∪
N is a constant. Here, NS is a set of network slices, C is a set of components,
P is a set of properties, T is a set of targets, R is a set of resources, A is a set
of actions, PER is a set of permissions and N is a set of natural numbers.
Each member of the set is represented in the form seti where i is a member
of the set NS. For example, ns1, ns2 ........nsn represent the members of the
set NS.
2. Variable Symbols: We define eight sets of variable symbols Vns, Vc, Vp, Vt,
Vo, Va, Vper ranging over the sets NS,C, P, T,R,A, PER respectively.
3. Predicate Symbols: The following predicate symbols are defined in our
model. Each n-ary predicate symbol is represented as p(t1,t2,...tn) where p
is the name of the predicate and n is its arity.
(a) HasC is a binary predicate symbol. Both the arguments of HasC are
members of C. The predicate defines a relationship between two compo-
nents in a given platform. For example, HasC(c1, c2) is read as compo-
nent ‘c1’ has (or contains) the component ‘c2’.
(b) HasNS is a binary predicate symbol. The first argument is a member
of NS and the second argument is a member of set C. It defines a
relationship between a network slice and a component. For example,
HasNS(ns1, c1) is be read as a network slice ns1 has the component c1.
(c) SatC is a binary predicate symbol. The first argument is a member of
C and the second argument is a member of P . It defines the relation-
ship between a component and the property it satisfies. For example,
SatC(c1, p1) is read as component c1 satisfies the property p1.
(d) SatNS is a binary predicate symbol. The first argument is a member of
NS and the second argument is a member of P . It defines the relation-
ship between a network slice and the property it satisfies. For example,
SatNS(ns1, p1) is read as network slices ns1 satisfies the property p1.
(e) PreReq is a quaternary predicate symbol. PreReq defines the ‘prereq-
uisite’ relationship between two SatC predicates. For example,
PreReq((c1, p1), (c2, p2)) is equivalent to ¬SatC(c1, p1)← ¬SatC(c2, p2).
(f) Do is a quaternary predicate symbol. The first argument is a member
of NS, the second argument is a member of R, the third argument is a
member of A and the fourth argument is a member of the set Permissions,
Per = {allow,deny}. It defines the authorisations that are held for each
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platform on each object. For example, Do(pf1, r1, a1, allow) is read as
platform pf1 is allowed to perform action a1 on the resource r1.
Definition 6. Component-Property (CP) Rule: A CP rule is of the form:
SatC(c, p)← L1 ∧ L2 ∧ ....Ln.
where c,p are elements of the sets C and P respectively, n ≥ 0, L1....Ln are either
SatC, HasC literals. (i) A rule with only SatC literals in the body indicates the
abstraction of one property type to another. There must be at least one SatC
literal in the body for this rule. Examples (a) and (b) illustrate this. (ii) The rule
may also be used to show that a component may satisfy one property if one of
its sub-components satisfies the same (or a different) property. Here, one HasC
literal and a minimum of one SatC literal is required. This is shown in example
(c) below.
(a) SatC(c1, p1)← SatC(c1, p2)
(b) SatC(c1, T rusted True)←
SatC(c1, Hash e2c182bbb85c2e3a5fcae1936c5900cf91dd7743) ∧
SatC(c1,Malware False)
(c) SatC(c1, p1)← SatC(c2, p2) ∧HasC(c1, c2)
The first rule reads: for a given component c1 to satisfy a property p1, c1 must
satisfy the property p2. This rule is particularly useful for abstracting properties
at one level to properties at a different level.
The second rule reads: component c1 may be trusted (property name = trusted
and property value = true) if c1 measures up to the given 160-bit binary value
and if c1 has no malware (property name = malware, property value = false).
The third rule reads: for a component c1 to satisfy a property p1, c2 must satisfy
p2 and c1 must contain c2. For example, an application (c1) can perform auditing
operations (p1) if it (c1) contains another sub-component (c2) that records all
audit logs (p2).
Definition 7. Network Slice-Property (NSP) Rule: A NSP rule is:
SatNS(ns, p)← L1 ∧ L2 ∧ ....Ln.
where ns, p are elements of the sets NS and P respectively, n ≥ 0, L1....Ln are
either SatC, SatNS or HasNS literals. (i) A rule with only SatNS literals in the
body indicates the abstraction of one property type to another. There must be at
least one SatNS literal in the body for this rule. Example (a) illustrates this. (ii)
The rule may also be used to show that a platform may satisfy one property if
one (or more) of its components satisfies the same (or a different) property. Here,
one HasNS literal and a minimum of one corresponding SatC literal is required.
This is shown in example (b) below. Note that this rule may also contain SatNS
literals as shown in example (c).
(a) SatNS(ns1, p1)← SatNS(ns1, p2)
(b) SatNS(ns1, p1)← SatC(c2, p2) ∧HasNS(ns1, c2)
(c) SatNS(ns1, p1)← (SatC(c2, p2) ∧HasNS(ns1, c2)) ∧ (SatNS(ns1, p3)
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Rule (a) reads: A network slice ns1 satisfies the property p1 if the network slice
also satisfies property p2. For example, a network slice (ns1) is trustworthy (p1)
if it belongs to subnet x (p2).
Rule (b) reads: a network slice ns1 is said to satisfy a property p1 if it has a
component c2 and if c2 satisfies the property p2. For example, a network slice is
considered to be safe (p1) if it has an antivirus software (c2) that is up-to-date
(p2).
Rule (c) adds an extra condition to Rule (b) that the network slice must also
satisfy the property p3. For example, a network slice ns1 is considered to be safe
(p1) if it has an antivirus software (c2) that is up-to-date (p2) and if the network
slice is spyware-free (p3).
3.2 Trust Evaluation
Our trust evaluation is a logic program, which comprises a set P of program
clauses. The set P consists of a set of rules and set of facts. The program together
with a query Q describes the deduction. Facts are predicates as defined in the
previous section. Rules are either CP or NSPP as given in Definitions 6 and 7. A
query is a request for trust derivation accompanied by network slice credentials.
The trust resolution ruke determines whether the query is satisfiable (and hence
the goal achievable) given the set of facts and rules.
Now let us consider the trust derivation process from the network slice credentials
provided at the time of query request. From the previous section, we use hashed
digest certificates and property certificates as credentials.
1. HasNS: The trust resolution derives the HasNS information from the hashed
digest report generated at the time of attestation request. It includes the list
of individual components that are measured in a network slice and their
respective hash measurements. The trust resolution uses this report to de-
termine the list of components available in a network slice and builds a list
of derived facts in the form of HasNS literals. These derived facts will then
be used in the resolution algorithm.
2. HasC: The trust resolution derives the HasC information using the hashed
digest report. A HasC predicate defines the decomposition of a component
into many sub-components. The hashed digest report contains a list of sub-
components for every component measured. The trust resolution can deter-
mine which sub-components are included in a given component and builds
a list of derived facts in the form of HasC. These derived facts will be used
in the trust derivation algorithm.
3. SatPF and SatC: The trust resolution derives the properties satisfied by
a network slice and component from the property certificates and maps this
information to SatNS and SatC literals respectively. These derived facts will
be used in the trust derivation algorithm.
3.3 Trust Derivation Algorithm
The trust derivation algorithm checks for each SatNS in the query request,
whether it can be derived from the network slice property certificate. It also
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verifies that any prerequisites for SatNS (as facts) are satisfied before marking
the SatNS as satisfied. If the SatNS cannot be derived from the property certifi-
cates, it checks whether there are NSP rules with SatNS in the head of the rule.
It tries to resolve the NSP rule to determine whether SatNS can be satisfied.
Then for each HasNS in the NSP rule, it checks whether HasNS can be derived
from the hashed digest report. If yes, it marks HasNS as satisfied. Then for
each SatC in the NSP rule, it checks whether the SatC can be derived from the
property certificates. If yes, it marks SatC as satisfied. If not, it carries out CP
resolution.
The evaluation for CP resolution is similar to the above. For each SatC in the
CP rule, it first checks whether the SatC can be derived from the component
property certificate. If so, it also verifies that any prerequisites for SatC (as facts)
are satisfied before marking SatC as satisfied. If the SatC cannot be derived from
the property certificates, it checks whether there are CP rules with SatC as head
of the rule. It tries to resolve the CP rule to determine whether SatC can be
satisfied.
Then for each HasC in the CP rule, it checks whether HasC can be derived
from the property certificates. If yes, it marks the HasC literal as satisfied. If all
literals are satisfied, then it goes back to the return to query request resolution.
Then finally, if all literals required in the query request are satisfied, then the
algorithm outputs the trust outcome.
4 Trust Management Architecture (T-MANO)
In this section, we describe the trust management architecture and the proto-
type implementation instantiating trusted network slices using the Open Source
MANO platform for 5G networks.
4.1 Trust Management Architecture
T‐MANO App
VIM1
VNFx
Trust Policy 
Repository
Network Slice 
Trust Evaluator
NFVO‐M
Slice‐X 
OSS App
Cloud Infrastructure‐1
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Authority 
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VIM2
Cloud Infrastructure‐2
SI
DI
SI
DI
SI
DI
Attested Property 
Interface Library
VNFMTrust 
Manager
Fig. 2: Trust Management Architecture
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The four main components of the trust management architecture are: Trust
Manager, T-MANO App, Trusted Authority and Trust Policy Repository. The
Trust Manager is the primary component of the architecture. The T-MANO
App is the front end interactive interface for the Trust Manager. The T-MANO
App collects the users/providers’ requests for trusted network slices. The Trust
Manager evaluates the trust of the network slice which is composed of a set of
VNFs deployed in multiple VMs across different physical platforms. The Trusted
Authority determines the attested properties of the VNFs and VMs. In our
architecture, it can perform both binary and property-based attestation. The
Trust Policy Repository (TPR) specifies the trust requirements on the VNFS
and VMs that need to be satisfied by the users and providers.
The basic operation of the trust management is as follows. The Trust Manager
collects static and dynamic information about each VNF and the associated VMs
where it is deployed. Static information is collected when the virtual machines are
imported from the cloud infrastructure. Dynamic information consists of VNF
deployment and VM run-time information. These happen via the Information
Interface Library (IIL). It provides the static and dynamic information to the TA
and obtains from the TA the corresponding properties (of the VNFs and VMs)
attested by the TA. This happens via the Attested Property Interface Library
(APIL). Then it retrieves the corresponding trust policies (for the VNFS and
VMs) from the Trust Policy Repository (TPR) via the Policy Interface Library
(PIL). The Evaluation Engine (EE) evaluates the trust of the VNFs and its
associated VMs by checking whether the attested trust properties (from the
TA) match with the required trust policies of VNFs and VMs (from the TPR).
Finally, the overall trust of network slice is determined by aggregating the trust
of the collection of VNFs and their associated VMs by the Network Slice Trust
Evaluator (NSTE). This is then passed to the T-Mano App.
Let us now consider the operational view of the trust management architecture.
The architecture uses two types of information in its trust decision making.
Definition 8. Static Information - Information about virtual machines (VM)
and VNFs when they are not actively participating in any network-related activ-
ity.
There are three occasions in which such information are generated: (i) when im-
porting a VM file from the cloud infrastructure or a pre-configured VNF from
a third-party storage; (ii) when deploying the VNF and associated VM and (iii)
past information from a network slice that had been previously used by the MANO
infrastructure but is currently sitting idle.
Definition 9. Dynamic Information - Information about a network slice
and associated VNFs when they are actively participating in a network-related
activity. For instance, a VNF being executed in VMs performing certain network
activity.
The overall operation is divided into two phases, namely, pre-deployment phase
and deployment/active phase. The Trusted Authority (TA) acts as the attes-
tation authority for both phases. It is capable of performing both binary and
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Fig. 3: Timeline for Trust Evaluation of Network Slice
property-based attestation. The sequence of events performed in both phases
is the same. However, the types of information concerning network slices used
are different. The pre-deployment phase-only uses static information, whereas
the active phase uses both. Hence, we will describe only the active phase of the
operation.
In our architecture, we have made the design choice to use a single TA for both
VM and VNFM layers. In practice, this can be implemented as two separate
authorities, one for the VNF and the other for the VM layer.
In the pre-deployment phase, VMs are imported from a third-party vendor in
the cloud or can be created locally. In both cases, VIM generates VM hashes and
checks them with the source hash. The IIL collects the physical platform and
VM information. The APIL communicates with the TA for property-attestation
purposes. The PIL collects the trust policies from the TPR. The EE evaluates
the attested proerties against the policies. The NSTE is an aggregator module
which combines the trust evaluation of the set of deployed VNFs on the VMs to
determine the trustworthiness of the network slice.
Let us now consider the timeline of the events involved in the operation of the
network slice trust evaluation as shown in Figure 3. A user or provider creates
a network slice. The OSS App and VNFM help to create it. The VIM deploys
the functions and VMs. There are two ways in which T-MANO App functions.
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First, it works in coordination with the OSS App, before and after the network
slice deployment, to periodically check the trustworthiness of the network slices.
Second, a user/provider at run-time can request the trustworthiness of a network
slice.
Hence, we now consider how the T-MANO app requests the trust evaluation of
the network slice, which is applicable to both these cases. Assume the T-MANO
App asks the NSTE to evaluate the trustworthiness of a network slice (S1). It
provides the Slice-ID as the identifier. The NSTE uses the VNFM store and
network descriptor file to disintegrate the network slice information, to find out
the individual VNFs and the VMs involved. It then asks the EE to evaluate each
VNF/VM for their individual trustworthiness (S2). The EE asks IIL to provide
the static and dynamic information associated with the VNF/VM S3. The IIL
maintains links with the cloud infrastructure hypervisor and VNFM to collect
information about any specific VNF/VM (links are marked blue in the Fig-
ure). After collecting the information bundle, IIL forwards it to the APIL(S4).
The APIL uses this information bundle and asks TA for attestation(S5). The
TA checks the information and generates property attestation report (Listing 1.1
gives an example of a sample VNF Property Attestation Certificate).It signs this
report and forwards it to the APIL(S6). APIL forwards this to the EE(S7). The
EE requests the PIL for the corresponding trust policies (S8). MANO adminis-
trators can add, update and delete trust policies in the TPR.(using a template
based language). These policies are structured per domain and parameterized
over VNF/VM and slice (Listing 1.2 shows an example schema for this repos-
itory). The PIL forwards the specific policies of that network slice realm (S9).
The EE evaluates the trust of each VNF/VM against these policies. It compares
the attested trust properties of a VM or VNF against the trust policies in the
TPR. It uses the LOPAT language and Algorithm 1 to check the properties.
The VNF/VMs which satisfy the policies are considered as trusted. If they fail
to satisfy the policies, they are considered as untrusted. In some cases, there can
be conflicts as to refer any VNF/VM as trusted or untrusted; in such cases, they
are termed as uncertain. The complete evaluation report is forwarded to the
NSTE (S10).The NSTE then determines the overall trustworthiness of the spe-
cific Slice-ID. Finally, it provides the response to the query from the T-MANO
App concerning the trustworthiness of the network slice with Slice-ID. If the
network slice is untrustworthy, then the OSS App can dynamically replace the
untrustworthy VNFs in that network slice and request for re-evaluation.
5 Prototype Implementation and Analysis
5.1 NFV Infrastructure Environment Setup
We have developed a proof of concept prototype of our trust management archi-
tecture. Our prototype uses one server (2 Intel Xeon CPU X5650 @2.67 GHz;
64GB of RAM) and a workstation (Intel Core i7 - 7700K @ 4.20GHz CPU; 64
GB of RAM) for the implementation. We have used Open Source MANO [10]
for creating the management infrastructure and OpenStack for the cloud infras-
tructure. We have deployed the Open Source MANO in the workstation. Open
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Source MANO is an ETSI standard open-source implementation of NFV Man-
agement and orchestration. OpenStack over the Xeon Server allows us to create
and deploy IaaS cloud infrastructure enabling the creation, deployment and man-
agement of the VMs [22]. We have used Python to develop different modules of
our architecture. We have used JSON database for storing information about
the properties.
5.2 Performance Analysis
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Fig. 4: Aggregated On-boarding Processing Delay
On-boarding Process Delay (OPD) is the time required to boot a VNF and its
associated VM resources [24]. The sum of such OPDs for an infrastructure is
known as aggregated OPD. We have presented a comparison of the aggregated
OPDs when using our trust management architecture in Figure 4. We have per-
formed experiments to extract the delays. In these experiments, we have used
a varying number of VMs from 10 to 40 to deploy the VNFs and measured the
aggregated OPD time. In each case, we have varied the number of properties
from 100 to 400 and measured the delays incurred. In order for the VMs to be
trusted, they need to satisfy these properties. We have performed each experi-
ment 10 times and have taken the average delay time. We have used Gnocchi
to collect the OPDs [11]. Figure 4 shows the variation of aggregated OPD with
varying number of properties. One can see from the results that without our
trust management architecture, the aggregated OPD is 453.64 seconds with 10
VMs and it increases to 1793.84 seconds with 40 VMs. We will refer to this
delay as the base delay for this specific network environment setup. With our
trust management architecture, each VNF and associated VMs must go through
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the property-based attestation (As explained in the operation above) incurring
a greater delay. For instance, with 10 VMs and 100 properties, the aggregated
OPD measured from our experiments is 478.56 seconds (which is approximately
a 5 percent increase). Over all our experiments, using our architecture, the ag-
gregated OPD is higher in the range of 5 − 12 percent compared to the base
delay.
The network slices and associated VNF/VMs consume a CPU resources and
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hence CPU usage is another important parameter to consider in performance
analysis. Gnocchi helped us to measure the CPU usages. As the number of VMs
increases, as expected, the CPU usage increases. For instance, the CPU usage
was around 57.7 percent with 10 VMs running and it increased to 86.2 percent
with 40 VMs. Using our trust management architecture, the CPU usage increases
approximately 4-8 percent. With 10 VMs using 400 properties, the aggregated
CPU usage is 68.2 percent and it increases to 91.8 percent with 40 VMs.
We have carried out many experiments using different setups and have presented
some of these results just to some indications of the increase in delay incurred
due to the proposed architecture. The OpenMANO infrastructure performance
is highly dependant on physical and virtual resources, and the configuration con-
text of the network environment. Due to this diversity, there is not a standard
performance benchmark for such systems [24]. Hence our performance metrics
should not be treated as providing a standard but rather as some indications
of the impact of our architecture on the overall performance. Furthermore, note
that we have focused only on the trust related aspects of the performance.
5.3 Attack Detection and Mitigation using Trust Architecture
In this section, we discuss an attack scenario specific to Mano infrastructure and
show how our trust management architecture can help to detect and mitigate
the attack.
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Consider a network service provider using a network slice X, which has VNF001
for processing data packets. The VNF001 is using two VMs to perform this net-
work service. Assume both these VMs are Linux VMs and are manufactured by
a third-party.
In the legitimate case, the network provider’s slices will serve its users by pro-
cessing their network packets, and the VMs will be doing the processing.
Assume that one of the Linux VMs (192.168.56.109) is equipped with zsh shell.
The VM also has the usual bash shell. The zsh shell is a legitimate shell and
assume that it was not active during the time of deployment. Now consider this
specific VM has a logic bomb (logicBOMB.sh) script, which is time-triggered,
meaning that it will become active after a certain amount of time elapses. Since
the logic bomb script was inactive and zsh shell was a legitimate shell, the in-
tegrity check during the VM deployment was unable to detect this anomaly. Also
the property based trust attestation for the VM at that time turned out to be
trusted.
Then we made the script alive, which activated the zsh shell and disabled the ad-
dress randomisation. This made the system vulnerable to buffer-overflow attack.
Now, we introduced an adversary (192.168.56.107) to exploit the buffer-overflow
to get a backdoor to the zsh shell. Without our trust management solution, the
adversary was successful in getting the backdoor to the VM and was able to
launch further attacks. Figure 6 shows such a successful attack. The upper part
of the figure shows the logicBOMB.sh script is running in the victim VM and
the bottom part shows the reverse shell in the attackers machine.
However, our trust management solution is able to identify the changes in the
VM and stop the attack. Recall our trust management architecture has a policy
repository which has rules such as ”there should not be any malicious script run-
ning in the VM”. This policy must be satisfied by the VNF/VM of the network
slice for it to execute. Once the script starts to execute, based on the dynamic
information, the TA will not be able to provide a property based attestation
satisfying the above rule in the trust policy. This will cause an alert to the T-
MANO App, which in turn with the help of OSS App and VIM isolates the
vulnerable VM. The vulnerable VM is then replaced with a suitable legitimate
VM on the fly, thereby maintaining the activity of the network slice.
6 Related Work
The OpenMANO infrastructure uses a diverse number of platforms, hardware
and software for the provision of network services as well as ensuring the quality
of service demands of user and providers. Hence the need for trust relationships
between the various components in the infrastructure and the services is criti-
cal. As far as we are aware the architecture proposed in this paper is one of the
first ones to have gone through in detail the trust mechanisms required for the
provision of trustworthy network slices. In this section, we will consider some
related works that are relevant to various parts of our trust architecture, and
discuss how our approach compares and extends these previous works.
Paladi et al. in [21] presented a technique to secure the network assets like keys,
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certificates and session data in an isolated environment. They have used Intel -
SGX [5]to create trustworthy enclaves in OpenFlow devices which allows trusted
network provisioning. This work focuses on SDN domain and OpenFlow devices.
Our work extends this research by associating property-based trust attestation
for the virtual and physical network assets in NFV infrastructures. Further-
more, our trust architecture caters for a multi authority-based infrastructure
like MANO, which forms the foundation for 5G network architecture.
Trusted Click is another work that is relevant which uses Intel SGX based ap-
proach for NFV. Here the authors have used Click modular router [13] to create
secure NFV application enclaves. Each enclave will process and maintain the
security and privacy of the network packets. For secure transmission of network
packets from one SGX enclave to another, they have created secure SGX chan-
nels. In our proposed architecture, the focus is on the trustworthiness of the
network slices at run time by using the trust properties of VNFs as well as those
of VMs where the VNFs are deployed in the construction and provisioning of
network slices. This enables to detect malicious behavioural changes in the VNFs
alerting the management authorities as well as their dynamic replacement lead-
ing to continued provision of secure network services.
TruSDN is another Intel-SGX based approach to bootstrap trust into SDN in-
frastructure [20]. TruSDN creates SGX enclaves for network endpoints and uses
remote attestation to ensure their integrity. It allows TruSDN to establish secure
communication channels between the endpoints. Our work extends this approach
by performing both binary attestation and property-based attestation, both at
boot and run time to ensure the trustworthiness of the network slices serving
the user/providers.
Benedictis et al. in [6] discusses issues in incorporating trust in ETSI specified
MANO infrastructure. They have also demonstrated Intel Open Cloud Integrity
Technology (CIT), which can be used in MANO to address certain trust issues.
However, this work does not consider the trustworthiness of a network slice,
which we have addressed in this paper.
Bin et al. in [12] propose a Trusted Zone architecture for the 5G network. Here,
Trust Zones are defined as a set of network functions serving a local cell which
has different policies to ensure data security. We believe the scope of trust poli-
cies is related to the notion of trust zone in their paper. Hence their work is
somewhat complementary to our work. We can augment our work using their
trust zone notion to define the domains associated with our trust policies. The
trust architecture in this paper based on property based attestation, both at
boot and run time, and the evaluation of trust of VNFs and VMs to determine
the overall trustworthiness of a network slice all remain the same for a given
domain.
We have used property based attestation to develop trust enhanced authorisa-
tion systems for distributed services in our earlier works [16], [17]. These have
been relevant for the design of trust management architecture in this paper.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Network slices in future communication networks (such as 5G) enable the provi-
sion of end to end logical networks running over a common infrastructure. They
are needed for supporting a variety of vertical industries having a wide range of
different service requirements. Security and trust issues play a critical role when
there are different network slices operating over the same 5G infrastructure.
In this paper, we have addressed the fundamental issue of trust of a network
slice. We have presented the design of a trust model to evaluate the trust of
the of the virtual network functions that compose the network slice. The model
evaluates the trust of the virtual network functions as well as the properties
that should be satisfied by the virtual platforms (both at boot and run time)
on which these network functions are deployed have for them to be trusted. It
allows the users and providers to measure the trustworthiness of network slices.
We have presented a logic-based language that defines simple rules for the spec-
ification of properties and the conditions under which these properties are eval-
uated to be satisfied for trusted virtualised functions and components. We have
designed a trust management architecture and mechanisms that enable the ser-
vice providers to determine the trustworthiness of the network slices providing
the network services. We have described a prototype implementation of the trust
management architecture using Open Source MANO Platform and presented the
performance results. The results show that our trust mechanisms cause only a
slight delay in the performance of the deployment of network slices establishing
end to end services over virtualised infrastructures. We have also discussed how
the proposed architecture can be used to detect and mitigate the impact of ma-
licious virtual network functions in a dynamic manner.
Currently we are working on an enhanced version of the proposed architecture
that can take into account reputation and recommendations from different net-
work services and slices. We are also working on additional mechanisms that can
be used to enhance the scalability of the proposed architecture.
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Fig. 6: Successful Reverse Shell attack
21
A Appendix: Attack Detection
B Appendix: Algorithms
Algorithm 1: Trust Derivation Algorithm
1 For each literal in Do
2 if SatNS literal then
3 if SatNS derived from PCert then
4 if prerequisites of SatNS are satisfied then
5 literal SatNS satified ;
6 else if SatNS in the head of NSP rule then
7 if Body of NSP rule contains SatNS literal then
8 Go to line 3;
9 if Body of NSP rule contains HasNS literal then
10 if HasNS is derivable from DR then
11 Mark literal HasNS satified;
12 else if Body of NSP rule contains SatC literal then
13 call CP resolution algorithm ;
14 if all literals in Do are marked satisfied then
15 output permissions in Do;
Algorithm 2: CP Resolution Algorithm
1 Read the SatC literal in the head of the CP rule
2 if SatC is derivable from PCert then
3 if prerequisites of SatC are Satisfied then
4 Mark literal SatC satisfied;
5 else if SatC is head of another CP rule then
6 if Body of CP rule contains SatC literal then
7 Goto line 1;
8 if Body of CP rules contains HasC literal then
9 if HasC is derivable from PCert then
10 Mark literal HasC satisfied;
Algorithm 3: Evaluation Engine’s Functional Algorithm
1 fetch;
Data: V NFx = V NF1, V NF2, ..., V NFx
Data: SIx = SI1, SI2, ..., SIN
Data: DIx = DI1, DI2, ..., DIN
Data: Pri = Pr1, Pr2, ..., Prn
2 evaluator()
3 foreach V NF in V NFx do
4 status = propertyStatus(SIx, DIx, Pri)
5 if status == untrusted then
6 send(isolate-VNF);
7 break;
8 else if status == trusted then
9 send(Trusted);
10 break;
11 else
12 send(isolate-VNF);
13 break;
14 end
15 end
16 propertyStatus(SIx,DIx,Pri)
17 TD = convert(DIx);
18 TS = convert(SIx);
19 foreach Pr in Pri do
20 if Pri! = (TD AND TS) then
21 return untrusted;
22 else if Pri == (TD AND TS) then
23 return trusted;
24 else
25 return suspicious;
26 end
27 end
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C Appendix: Repositories
Listing 1.1: A Sample VNF Property Attestation Certificate
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<vnfCertificate>
<certificateInfo>
<id>00001</id>
<issuer>TA</issuer>
<issuerKey>"AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBE
GfjPzZ1KEdoDAehYzGa+Upj0sYDV+Ol3OMg6em9vVxXjdCLcPmNq/vBYlTGqX/2g2uCNi7rD1DUPFI5CL1T3o"</issuerKey>
<signAlgo>ECDSA</signAlgo>
<digitalSign>a31193129ab9d43ed3f3014412773afb22ec6b1630e0931be0dac4fb653bd993</digitalSign>
<validity>24hr</validity>
</certificateInfo>
<vnfInfo>
<id>022RV</id>
<vnfName>router</vnfName>
<vnfMake>OF</vnfMake>
<vnfPurpose>l2router</vnfPurpose>
<vnfMap>
<serviceVMinfo>
<vmid>D1X022RV</vmid>
<vmName>sakura</vmName>
<vimLocation>"link"</vimLocation>
</serviceVMinfo>
</vnfMap>
</vnfInfo>
<staticProperty>
<vnfHashinfo>
<value>1a0f21437fc619acc51a81d552e9af77562263f7589f72752ac492caac9f7ed5</value>
<issuer>ON</issuer>
<type>SHA2</type>
</vnfHashinfo>
<serviceVMHashinfo>
<value>d41dc6385e804fd6c6fe049ecd56a3c1bafa61e669d4f3b49082ff56f8ade10d</value>
<issuer>ubuntu</issuer>
<type>SHA2</type>
</serviceVMHashinfo>
</staticProperty>
<dynamicProperty>
<vnfProperty>
<p>"No Malware"</p>
<p>"Memory Integrity ok"</p>
<p>"No Extra Service Running "</p>
</vnfProperty>
<serviceVMProperty>
<p>"Trusted Processes are Running "
<v>10</v>
</p>
<p>"No Memory Leakage"</p>
<p>"No External Software Call"</p>
</serviceVMProperty>
</dynamicProperty>
</vnfCertificate>
Listing 1.2: A Sample Trust Policy
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<trustPolicy>
<info>
<id>01</id>
<creator>Bob</creator>
<cRole>admin</cRole>
</info>
<rule>
<target>
<platform> Any Network Slice</platform>
<resources> Domain 1</resources>
<condition>
<entity>
<vnf>
<sP> Hash is Valid </sP>
<sP> Digital Signature is Valid </sP>
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<dP> No Malware </dP>
<dP> Memory Integrity OK </dP>
<dP> No Extra Service Running </dP>
</vnf>
<serviceVM>
<sP> Hash is Valid </sP>
<dP> No Memory Leakage </dP>
<dP> Trusted Processes are Running </dP>
<dP> No External Software Call </dP>
</serviceVM>
</entity>
</condition>
<action>
<bTime>Trusted</bTime>
<rTime>Trusted</rTime>
</action>
</target>
</rule>
</trustPolicy>
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